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Investing to cooperate:
theory and experiment∗. †
Jean-Pierre Benoˆıt‡, Roberto Galbiati§and Emeric Henry¶
Abstract
We study theoretically and in a lab-experiment investment decisions in environments where
property rights are absent. In our setting a player chooses an investment level before interacting
repeatedly with a given set of agents. The investment stochastically affects the payoffs of
the game in every subsequent period. We show that more volatile returns make investment
more difficult in the absence of legal protection, and might force the investor to invest more
to guarantee cooperation. Experimental results are broadly consistent with the theoretical
findings.
JEL: C72, C73, C91, C92
Keywords: investment, experiments, repeated games, property rights
1 Introduction
An entrepreneur considers investing in a foreign country where there is a risk of expropriation. A
user of a public good needs to invest to improve its quality in a setting where overuse of the public
good is a serious concern. A firm must decide how much to invest in innovation in an environment
where intellectual property rights are weak. In all these examples involving an investment decision,
legal protection being weak or absent, the incentive to initially invest might appear weak. However,
these investments are typically embedded in a dynamic environment where the parties involved
keep interacting. In this context, the disciplining value of repeated interactions can serve as a
substitute for legal environments. In this setting, we explore theoretically and empirically how
the levels of investment differ depending on the legal regime and how they compare when we vary
a particular characteristic of the environment, namely the volatility of returns.
∗A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Rational Parasites” (CEPR DP 9351)
†We wish to thank the participants to the workshop on ’extensive form games in the lab’ at Sciences Po and to
many seminars for useful comments. We thank Sri Srikandan for invaluable help in programming the experiment
and Mario Luca for excellent research assistance.
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To understand the role of volatility, consider two distributions of returns F and G where G
is a mean preserving spread of F . Because these two distributions generate the same expected
profits, risk neutral agents would make the same investments in a legal regime, whether they face
F or G. On the other hand, in a regime without legal protection, large returns make cooperation
through repeated interactions harder to sustain since the temptation to deviate are higher while
the promise of the future is kept constant. Such large returns are more likely to arise under
distribution G, thus potentially forcing the investor to initially invest more to sustain cooperation.
We run an experiment designed to capture such environments and study the investment de-
cision. We adopt a 2x2 design where we vary both the legal regime (either legal protection LP
or no protection NP ) and the shape of returns from investment (either low volatility LV or high
volatility HV ). Participants play a series of games of indefinite length, generated using a random
continuation rule. In all treatments, in the first round of each game, the player in the role of
investor chooses an investment level which can either be zero or one of 3 possible positive values.
This initial investment determines, in each period of the indefinitely repeated game that follows,
the probability of getting a prize of fixed value. In the legal protection treatments, whenever a
prize is obtained, the investor obtains the full value. In the no protection treatments, the investor
faces in all subsequent rounds another player and when a prize is obtained, the two players play
a symmetric prisoner’s dilemma where if both players cooperate they share the prize.
In the high volatility (HV ) treatments, for all levels of investment, the value of the prize is
twice as high as in the low volatility (LV ) treatments, but the probability of obtaining it is twice
as low. The distribution of returns in the HV treatments is thus a mean preserving spread of the
distribution in LV . Under legal protection, the optimal investment is the same regardless of the
volatility of returns since the expected return is unaffected.
In the particular case of the experiment, we show that our theoretical results imply that in
the LV treatments without legal protection, all investment levels are part of an equilibrium, while
in the HV treatment, an investment of 1 (the optimal level of investment with protection) is no
longer an equilibrium. Empirically, we show that indeed an investment of 1 is significantly less
likely in the HV treatment. We have therefore identified circumstances under which all equilibria
with positive levels of investment involve more investment in the absence of protection. The reason
is that higher initial investments shift up the distribution of future returns, thereby facilitating
cooperation as the future returns to cooperation increase.1 Coherently with the theoretical model
we find that, if Player 1 happens to invest 1 in the NP-HV treatment, it is more likely to be
followed by deviations in the prisoner’s dilemma that follows, in particular by Player 2.
Furthermore we find that in our experiment, the average level of investment is slightly higher in
the treatments without protection, in particular in the case where returns are volatile. Indeed, in
the NP-HV treatment, both the zero investment outcome and strictly higher levels of investments
1Note that we make no claim that these higher levels of investment are welfare increasing. Among other things,
in the presence of high fixed costs welfare comparisons depend upon how much of the surplus firms manage to
capture.
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become more likely, suggesting that some participants revert to the degenerate equilibrium –
no investment/ no cooperation – while others choose to invest more to foster cooperation. The
overall level of investment is left unaffected. Even though this does not correspond to a theoretical
prediction, it shows that strong protection does not necessarily increase investment levels.
Our study contributes to the recent experimental literature on cooperation and collusion in
infinitely repeated games (Dal Bo 2005; Dreber et al. 2008; Camera and Casari 2009; Aoyagi and
Frechette 2009; Dal Bo and Frechette 2011; Bigoni, Potters and Spagnolo 2012). As in several
of these papers, our findings highlight the fact that players are sensitive to the future expected
profits when taking their current decisions.2 However, while this literature has mainly focused
on understanding both the dynamics of cooperation and the conditions favouring collusion or
cooperation in infinitely repeated games, our focus is on the comparison of investment choices
under different institutional regimes. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to examine
experimentally this type of game where a date zero decision influences the type of game played
repeatedly afterwards. Furthermore, this paper is also one of the few that offers an experimental
comparison of environments with and without protection.
The idea that repeated interactions can serve as a substitute for legal enforcement is already
well developed. Greif (1989, 1993) provides historical evidence. It is also the starting point of
the relational contracting literature (Klein and Leﬄer 1981, Levin 2003) that looks more in detail
at the contractual terms when interactions are repeated and contracts incomplete. However, in
these papers, investment is absent. One exception is Halac (2013), who examines theoretically a
similar setup to ours, with an investment decision before a repeated game. She also finds that
investment might be higher than in a fully contractible benchmark. Whereas our player invests
more in order to facilitate cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma, in Halac the player invests more
in order to increase her payoff from a bargaining game.
Ramey and Watson (1997) also examine a setting where a prior investment affects the shape of
a prisoner’s dilemma (in their setting, the investment affects only the payoff when both cooperate).
They share the idea that higher up-front investment favors cooperation. They do not, however,
focus on the comparison of investment levels between regimes nor do they study the types of
investment we can expect across regimes. They focus more specifically on how this initial decision
endogenously affects job destructions over the business cycle. In a very different setup, Levine
and Modica (2013) also examine a prior investment stage before a repeated interaction. The game
is a public goods game and they focus on how peer discipline can encourage initial investment.
Our paper is also related to the literature on collusion in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), who
study collusion in a stochastic environment over the business cycle. We add investments in this
framework. One interpretation of our model is that it endogenizes the shape of the business cycle.
We also model the stochastic return differently, which allows us to characterize the condition on
second order stochastic dominance. In a similar vein, Dal Bo (2007) studies collusion when the
2Indeed we will find that cooperation is higher when the investor invested more initially.
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interest rate fluctuates.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model. In
Section 3, we characterize the equilibria and derive our main theoretical results. In Section 4, we
present the experimental setup and results. All proofs are presented in the appendix.
2 Experimental design
We run an experiment designed to capture the effect on investment decisions of the legal regime
and, within each regime, the effect of the distribution of returns. We therefore adopt a two by
two design, giving 4 different treatments, with either legal protection (LP) or no legal protection
(NP) and with either high volatility of returns (HV) or low volatility (LV).
In all treatments, the length of each game is determined by a random continuation rule fol-
lowing closely the literature on indefinitely repeated games in the lab (see Dal Bo and Frechette
2011, Dal Bo 2005 and Casari and Camera 2009 for recent examples). Within a game, at the end
of each round, the computer randomly determines whether or not another round will be played
in the current game. The probability of continuation is fixed at 0.85 for all treatments and is
independent of any choices players make during the game.4 The players thus play a series of
games (that we call matches) of random length.
In all treatments, in the first round of each match, the player in the role of investor first obtains
an initial endowment of 11 tokens5 and makes an investment decision, choosing one among four
possible investment levels: 0, 1, 6 or 11 tokens. This initial investment determines, in each round
of the match, the probability of obtaining a prize, but has no influence on the other games.
The first difference between treatments lies in the distribution of returns on investment. In the
high volatility treatments (HV), the prize is twice as high as in the low volatility treatments (LV),
but for all levels of investment, the probability of obtaining the prize is twice as low. The expected
return for a given investment thus remains constant across treatments. The exact probabilities
and the level of the prize are detailed in Table 3. It is worth remarking that length of the match
(supergame) is random, and is independent of the investment decision, even if Player 1 invested
zero.
The second difference is what regime is in place in periods where a prize is obtained. In the
legal protection treatments (LP), the investor keeps the entire prize. The matches in the LP
treatments are thus single player games. On the contrary, in the no legal protection treatments
3Our theoretical and experimental results can also speak to the renewed debate on the use of patents to encourage
investments in innovation (Boldrin and Levine 2008, Bessen and Hunt 2007, Scherer and Ross 1990, Benoˆıt 1985,
Henry and Ponce 2011, Henry and Ruiz-Aliseda 2016, Boldrin and Levine 2002 and 2005, see also Anton and Yao
1994 and 2002). These papers show, in different environments, that innovation can occur in the absence of formal
protection. However, in all these contributions, less innovation is conducted than if the innovator was granted a
monopoly.
4This intermediate value of δ will guarantee that some investments are part of equilibria under NP-LV but not
under NP-HV.
51 token is converted to 5 cents for the final payment.
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Table 1: Prisoner’s dilemma when a prize is obtained
C D
C 12pi,
1
2pi 0, pi
D pi, 0 0, 0
(NP), in a round where a prize is obtained, the investor (player 1) faces a second player (player
2) and the two players play a prisoner’s dilemma game represented in Table 1.6
When a match (randomly) ends, a new one starts and is played in the same way. In the NP
treatments, players are randomly re-matched with a different player. When they are rematched,
it is randomly determined which player plays the role of the investor. The rematching procedure
works as follows: as soon as a pair finishes a match, each of its members is rematched with
one player, randomly chosen from the first available pair (i.e., either a pair is already waiting or
they have to wait for another pair to finish). This procedure guarantees that a subject doesn’t
immediately play with the same partner and limits the likelihood of being matched with the same
partner several times. In any case, the game is played anonymously and players cannot identify
their partner. For the NP treatments (resp. LP), fifteen minutes (resp. ten minutes) after the
start of the session, no new game starts but players finish the games they started.7
3 Model
In this section, we present a formal model, that is general enough to encompass many scenarios
of interest, and allows us in particular to make predictions that we test using our experimental
setup. In the next section, we provide several applications.
We consider an infinite horizon game with two players where periods are denoted by t and
future payoffs are discounted at rate δ by all players. In period 0, Player 1 makes an initial
investment k at cost c(k). The size of this initial investment stochastically affects the payoffs in
subsequent periods. Specifically, given a period 0 investment k, F (pi, k) is the i.i.d. cumulative
probability distribution of the payoff relevant variable pi ≥ 0 in each subsequent period. We
assume that F (0, 0) = 1, so that investment is necessary for a positive return, and, for k′ > k,
F (pi, k′) (weakly) first order stochastically dominates F (pi, k).
In the game with legal protection, that we use as a benchmark and that corresponds to the LP
treatments, in period t ≥ 1 player 1 mechanically collects the payoff realization pit while the other
player earns 0. Player 1 chooses an investment level that maximizes her total expected discounted
6In the LP treatments, whenever the investment is successful, the prize is obtained entirely by the single player.
Nevertheless, to keep the two set of treatments symmetric, players in the LP treatment also have to choose whether
they want to play C or D as in the NP treatment. The choice D gives them a profit of zero, and the choice they
have to make is thus obvious, but it preserves symmetry with the NP treatments.
7We did not put a time constraint on the games already started but they never lasted more than a few minutes.
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Table 2: Prisoner’s dilemma
C D
C αpˆit, αpˆit γpˆit, βpˆit
D βpˆit, γpˆit λpˆit, λpˆit
profits. That is, Player 1 chooses k (in period 0) to maximize −c(k) +∑∞t=1 δt ∫∞0 pidF (pi, k) =
−c(k)+ δ1−δE (pi|k), where E (pi|k) =
∫∞
0 pidF (pi, k) <∞. We suppose the maximization problem
has a solution k∗ > 0.
Without legal protection, corresponding to the NP treatments, following her initial investment,
player 1 engages in an infinite horizon game with another player we denote player 2. In each period
t ≥ 1, the players play a prisoner’s dilemma whose “scale” depends on the realization pit. As we
will see, it is more difficult for firms to cooperate in a period where the payoff realization is large.
Hence, it may be in Player 1’s interest to restrict the size of the payoff and we give him the option
of doing so by choosing, at no cost, a maximum value pi that the variable pi can take. We allow
that pi can be chosen to be ∞, so that no constraint is imposed. Note also that in the experiment
pi plays no role.
More precisely, the players engage in the following game:
• In period t = 0, Player 1 chooses k ≥ 0 and p¯i ∈ (R+,∞).
• In each period t ≥ 1,
1. A draw pit of the payoff relevant variable is taken from F (pi, k).
2. Every player chooses between two actions C (“cooperate”) and D (“deviate”) as a
function of (ht, pit), where ht denotes the history of play up to date t.
• Payoffs are described by the payoffs in Table 2, where pˆit = min (pit, pi):
We assume β > α, λ ≥ γ, λ < α, and 1 > β.8 These conditions mean that the game
played in each period is a prisoner’s dilemma, albeit one with, potentially, weakly dominant
strategies rather than strictly dominant ones. This potential difference is not important
and is only relevant for the experiment we run. The condition β < 1 ensures that Player 1
always does worse in the absence of legal protection.
The dynamic game will typically have many equilibria. For ease of exposition, we restrict
ourselves to symmetric subgame perfect equilibria. In such equilibria, along the equilibrium path
of play, either every player chooses C or every player chooses D. Our analysis can be extended
to allow for asymmetric equilibria.
8In our experiment α = 1/2, γ = λ = 0 and β = 1.
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For all individuals, α − λ provides a measure of the gains from cooperating, while β − α
measures the instantaneous benefits from deviating. It turns out that an essential characteristic
of the game is the following parameter, which we call the “cooperation ratio” of the game:
R ≡
[
α− λ
β − α
]
The cooperation ratio will be shown to be useful in structuring comparisons between investment
levels with and without protection. Below, we study some applications of the model.
3.1 Applications of the model
3.1.1 Investing in countries with weak property rights
Institutions play a key role in the amount of foreign direct investment flowing into countries
(Benassy-Quere et al 2007; Wheeler and Mody 1992; Daude and Stein 2007) and can also impact
the type of sectors attracting investments. Our model can capture the decision of a firm investing
in a country where it faces a risk of expropriation. The size of the initial investment affects
the stochastic production that the investment can generate. In each period that follows, the
government decides whether or not to expropriate the firm. In the Supplementary Appendix C,
we propose a precise parametrization of the payoffs of the different players.
3.1.2 Free-rider problem with weak property rights
In her Nobel lecture (2010), Ostrom describes her work on the different institutional arrangements
governing common pool resources. Referring to large scale studies of irrigation, she notes that
“farmer-managed systems are likely to grow more rice, distribute water more equitably and keep
their systems in better repair than government systems”. In the case of forests, she describes
activities undertaken by some members of the community to preserve the quality of the public
good.
Our model can be used to describe the interaction between users of a public good (such as
the wood from a forest in Ostrom’s example). In period 0, Player 1 has the capacity to make an
initial investment that will increase the quality of the public good. In each period t, a draw of pit
is taken, where pit is total size of the public good. The stochastic aspect in the case of the forest
is due, say, to fluctuating weather conditions. With legal property rights, Player 1 controls access
to the good. Without property rights, following a realization pit the players decide on their levels
of consumption of the public good. Action C corresponds to consuming a low amount and D a
high amount. Consumption at the low level provides a personal benefit, while exerting minimal
externalities on the other parties. Consumption at a high level imposes significant costs, so that
all players consuming at a high level is unsustainable for that period.9
9As written, this model does not take into account the dynamics of overuse of the public good in the sense that
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3.1.3 Application 3: investment in innovation
A growing share of innovation is conducted without the protection of patents. Consider the case
of the firm Red Hat, a very successful company selling an open source operating system and
investing heavily in research. Most of its revenues come from the sale of a pre-compiled version of
the open source operating system Linux, called Red Hat Enterprise Linux. As acknowledged in
Red Hat’s annual report: “anyone can copy, modify and redistribute Red Hat Enterprise Linux”.
Numerous clones do indeed exist, but they tend not to be very aggressive. Furthermore, even
in this environment with no protection, Red Hat invests a lot in innovation: it is the biggest
contributor to the Linux Kernel and pays the salaries of most of its researchers.
The model can be used to represent the interaction between an innovator and an imitator,
such as Red Hat and a clone. With this interpretation, the initial investment k is an investment
in innovative capability, such as a research facility. This investment determines the probability
distribution of future innovations.10 In each period, the firm randomly develops an innovation
which can instantly be brought to market. The market value of an innovation degrades over
time; for simplicity, the life span of a new product is exactly one period. The realization pit ≥ 0
is then monopoly profits in period t. In each period, the firms play a prisoner’s dilemma in
which defecting corresponds to charging a low price, while cooperating corresponds to charging
the monopoly price.11
4 Investing to cooperate
We now derive our main results, presenting in sections 4.1 and 4.2 the general characterization of
the equilibrium and the initial results and in section 4.3 the precise predictions in the context of
the experiment.
4.1 Equilibria
In the absence of legal protection, there always exists a degenerate equilibrium in which both
players play D in periods t = 1, 2..., regardless of the value of pi, and Player 1 invests, accordingly,
kd = arg maxk
{
−c(k) + δ1−δλ
∫∞
0 pidF (pi, k)
}
. If returns are small when players do not cooperate
(i.e., λ small), then kd will be small and may well be zero, as in the case of the experiment for
instance. This is the outcome most people have in mind when thinking of environments without
legal protection.
There can also exist non-degenerate equilibria where Player 1 invests a significant amount.
Indeed, it is already well understood that repeated interactions can serve as a substitute for
there is no linkage between the consumption today and the level of pi tomorrow. The externality is captured here
only within the period, but the model could be generalized to capture the dynamic externality.
10In a more general model, this stock investment would be complemented by on-going research expenditures. We
considered such a model in an earlier version, but this complication does not change our main results.
11See the Supplementary Appendix C for details on this application
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legal enforcement. For any investment k, if players are arbitrarily patient, they will be able
to cooperate in the subgame following period 0. Moreover, the discounted sum of payoffs from
repeated cooperation will more than compensate an arbitrarily patient Player 1 for his investment.
However, while significant investment may be easy with arbitrarily patient players, it is trickier
with moderately patient players who value short term gains. Proposition 1 describes the conditions
for an investment of k 6= kd by Player 1 to form part of an equilibrium. These conditions are
that i) the players manage to play cooperatively – hence, they prefer playing C in every period
to deviating for one period and subsequently obtaining the non-cooperative payoff forever (which
is captured by condition (1) below) and ii) Player 1 prefers investing k to playing the degenerate
equilibrium (condition 2).
Proposition 1 A choice of k 6= kd by Player 1 forms part of a symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium if and only there exists a pi such that:
pi ≤ δ
1− δR
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
(1)
and
− c(k) + δ
1− δα
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
≥ −c(kd) + δ
1− δλ
∫ ∞
0
pidF (pi, kd) (2)
Consider a path where Player 1 has limited the maximum payoff realization to pi by choosing
p¯i = pi in period 0. Condition (1) guarantees that the players cooperate for all payoff realizations
smaller or equal to pi (if there are no incentives to deviate for a realization pi, then it is also the
case for a realization pi ≤ pi). The term ∫ pi0 pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi)) is the expected per period
payoff when, for any realization of pi above pi, the payoff is limited to pi.
To understand the reason that Player 1 may choose to impose an upper bound p¯i, let pimax =
{suppi s.t. (1) holds}. Since the right hand side of (1) is bounded (by δ1−δR ∗ E (pi|k)), we have
pimax <∞. The quantity pimax provides an upper bound on the realization of pi for which players
can cooperate when player 1 invests k. Thus, it is in Player 1’s interest to limit the returns to
the investment to be at most pimax and to choose p¯i = pimax in period 0. If not, for realizations
pi > pimax, players would be unable to cooperate, low returns would be obtained, and the overall
expected return would be lowered.12
12At a more intuitive level, the higher the draw of pi, the larger the temptation to deviate and play D, since
the immediate gains from deviating are increasing in pi while the future expected draws and potential gains to
cooperating are unaffected (draws are i.i.d). Suppose that pi takes only two values piL and piH and that when pi
takes the value piH , players are unable to cooperate, while it is possible for a value piL. It would then be in the
interest of the players, when the draw of pi is piH , to restrict the value of pi to be piL, to allow for cooperation. For
instance, under the innovation interpretation from Section 3.1.3, the players engage in a pricing game following a
successful innovation. If the firms are not able to share monopoly profits when the draw is very high, they might
still find a lower price where cooperation is possible.
9
The existence of the upper bound pimax on the cooperative period payoff suggests that the
total surplus may be lower in the world without legal enforcement. This fact, combined with the
fact that Player 1 must share the returns from investment, and the need to satisfy equilibrium
constraints, implies that there may be some investment levels that, while profitable with legal
protection, do not form part of an equilibrium without such protection. Somewhat counter-
intuitively, we show in the next section that this may lead to higher equilibrium investments in
the absence of legal protections, to relax the investment constraint (1).
4.2 Volatility and investments
Different types of investments are more or less conducive to cooperation and thus more or less
likely to be observed absent legal protection. The following proposition shows that a ceteris
paribus increase in riskiness, in the sense of a mean-preserving spread, makes investment more
difficult in the absence of legal protections (even with risk-neutral players).13
Proposition 2 Let the distribution G be a mean-preserving spread of F . Suppose that with
returns characterized by the distribution G, there is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in
which Player 1 invests k. Then with returns characterized by the distribution F , there is also a
symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which Player 1 invests k. Conversely, suppose that with
returns characterized by F there is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which player 1
invests k 6= kd. There may not be a subgame perfect equilibrium in which Player 1 invests k when
returns are characterized by the distribution G.
This result has implications for the types of investments that should be observed in developing
countries (application 1, described in section 3). In countries with weak property rights, investors
worry about the risk of expropriation. Investments lead to random returns year to year and,
as shown by Duncan (2006) in an empirical study of the mining industry, expropriations are
much more likely in periods of price booms. Thus, an investor would be more likely to initially
choose an investment leading to less volatile returns. In line with this idea, Dorsey et al. (2008)
and Mikesell (1971) suggest that the share of FDI in minerals relative to petroleum is higher in
countries with strong property rights (oil prices being less volatile than most minerals). This is
of course only suggestive evidence and a more systematic empirical test of Proposition 2 would
be in order. This is precisely the purpose of our experiment, which tests this result by comparing
two types of treatments where the distribution of returns can be ranked according to second order
stochastic dominance.
13Similar reasoning shows that mean-preserving spreads makes collusion more difficult in the framework of Rotem-
berg and Saloner, although the way they model uncertainty does not allow them to reach this conclusion.
10
4.3 Theoretical analysis of the experiment
Proposition 2 can be used to compare the level of investment in environments where legal protec-
tion is available to the level in environments where it is not. This is often an ambiguous compar-
ison, with some non-degenerate equilibria in the no-protection game involving more investment
and some less. Rather than making a selection among equilibria, we examine a special case where
unambiguous statements can be made. We find conditions under which all non-degenerate equi-
libria without legal protections involve more investment than with legal protections. This special
case yields testable predictions that we explore in our experiment.
We now suppose that the returns from investment (F (pi, k)) takes the special form considered
in the experiment. In any period, there is either a “failure” worth 0 or a “success” worth p˜im and
the initial investment k determines the likelihood p(k) of obtaining p˜im in any single period.
14 We
use the variable m to parameterize the riskiness of the technology by writing a successful payoff
as p˜im =
pi0
m and the probability of success p (k) = mh (k). For any investment level k, variations
in m induce a mean-preserving spread and have no effect on the expected per period revenue
p(k)p˜im = h(k)pi0.
With legal protections, the optimal level of investment is independent of m. Formally, let k∗ =
arg max
{
−c(k) + δ1−δp (k) p˜im
}
= arg max
{
−c(k) + δ1−δh (k)pi0
}
. Then, with legal protections
k∗ is the optimal investment for all m ∈ (0, 1].
In the no protection regime, as explained in the previous section, a level of investment k can
be sustained if the following two conditions are met:
−k + δ
1− δ p(k)
1
2
pi ≥ 0
1
2
pi +
δ
1− δ p(k)
1
2
pi ≥ pi + 0
The first condition guarantees a positive investment and the second guarantees no deviation on
the equilibrium path.
As Proposition 2 showed, in the no-protection regime, investment k∗ gets harder to sustain
as m falls. An investment of k∗ that is sustainable for m = 1 may not be sustainable for smaller
values of m. The following proposition shows that, for some parameters, all non-degenerate
equilibria involve a greater investment than k∗.
Defining strict equilibrium an equilibrium in which all players strictly prefer following the
path to deviating, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 Suppose that for m = 1 there is a strict symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
14Consider, for instance, the application of the model to innovation. For certain types of products, the nature of
a successful innovation is not very variable and the investment level mainly influences the frequency of innovations.
Examples include the case of upgrades of software or smartphones, where the issue is mostly one of frequency rather
than quality. It may also be the case of the fashion industry (Raustiala and Sprigman, 2006), where a crucial factor
is the speed of introduction of new collections.
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in which Player 1 makes the incremental investment k∗ 6= kd. There exists values m and m
(m < m < 1) such that:
• If m ∈ [m, 1], there exist subgame perfect equilibria where Player 1 invests more than, less
than, or the same as k∗.
• If m ∈ [m,m], any non-degenerate equilibrium involves higher investments than with pro-
tection: k > k∗.
• If m ∈ [0,m] the only equilibrium is the degenerate equilibrium.
Moreover there are non-empty intervals on which such equilibria exist.
Consider the special case considered in our experiment.15 In the legal protection treatments,
the optimal choice of a risk-neutral player k∗ is an investment level of 1.16 In the LV treatment, 1
is part of an equilibrium, and so are all the other investment levels. The HV treatment is obtained
from the LV treatment by applying a factor m = 1/2: the prize is doubled but the probabilities
of success for all investment levels, are divided by two. We find that 1 is no longer part of an
equilibrium in the HV treatment, while all levels above 1 still are.
Examining the incentives of the players (shown in Table 4) following an investment of 1 by
player 1 brings out clearly the mechanism developed in the theory. In both the NP-HV and
NP-LV treatments, when player 1 invests 1, in the subgame following a successful realization of
the investment, each player’s continuation payoff is 6.8 if both of them play C for the rest of the
game. However, in the LV treatment (where the prize is low) a player’s instantaneous gain from
deviating to D is only 4, while in the HV treatment it is 8. Cooperation is thus possible only
with a low prize.
Our model allows us to make clear theoretical predictions. However, in practice, there will be
noisy deviations from equilibrium behavior. We do not model explicitly the process creating this
noise but assume that the distribution is the same in all treatments. This assumption allows us
to derive a number of empirical predictions from the theory. Our main prediction is the following:
Hypothesis 1: An investment of 1 is less likely in the NP-HV treatment than in the NP-LV
treatment.
The mechanism is based on the idea that, following an investment of 1, playing C is part of an
equilibrium in the LV treatment but isn’t in the HV treatment. This yields the second indirect
test of the theory
15In the specific case of the experiment, m = 0, 35 (value of m where players are exactly indifferent in a period
post investment between cooperating and deviating if the probability of getting the prize is 0.3 in future periods)
and m = 0.58 (same calculation for a probability of 0.5).
16Note however that the level of expected profits does not vary vastly across the different positive choices (12.6
for an investment of 1, 12.1 for 6 and 11.6 for 11. While an investment of 1 is optimal for a risk-neutral money
maximizer, subjects may have other motivations as well. For instance, they might get benefits from varying their
choices to break the tediousness of the task.
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Hypothesis 2: Following an investment of 1 by the investor, a play of D by player 2 is more
likely in the NP-HV treatment than in the NP-LV treatment.
Hypothesis 2 focuses on the actions of player 2 in the prisoner’s dilemma phase following an
investment of 1 by player 1. Cooperation or deviation following by player 1 after he invested 1 is
difficult to interpret since in the NP-LV investing 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium.
5 Experimental results
5.1 Procedure and summary statistics
The 10 experimental sessions (3 of each NP treatments and 2 of each LP treatment) were run
at the Ecole Polytechnique (France) in a dedicated experimental lab. A specific software was
designed to run the experiment to be able to rematch players while others were finishing their
game.17 The participants were a mix of students and staff at the university.
A total of 132 subjects participated in the experiment playing a total of 1756 supergames.
The average earnings of players was 17.8 euros.18 At the end of the experiment, participants were
asked to fill in a survey that allowed us to control for gender and whether the participants were
students. In the survey, we also introduced questions about individuals’ risk attitudes (Dohmen
et al 2011). Thus, in some of our analysis we can also control for subjects self-reported risk
attitudes.19 Table 5 in Appendix A reports summary statistics on subjects characteristics both
for NP and LP treatments and statistics about the structure of the games for NP treatments,
distinguishing between NP-HV and NP-LV. The majority of subjects are male students with
low levels of risk aversion. Focusing on NP treatments, subjects play on average 14 supergames
lasting 5 rounds each. 19 percent of subjects do not change strategy in different supergames and
stick to the initial choice of cooperation or defection and 3 percent of subjects stick to the initial
cooperation choice for the whole experiment.
In all the regression analysis that follow, the standard errors are clustered at the session level
(as in Dal Bo and Frechette 2011 for instance), to control for possible session effects that would
introduce correlation in errors.20
17The software was designed under a standard server/client architecture, the server uses’ socket protocol to
communicate with the clients. The server was implemented using the Adobe Flex technology and the clients
deployed under Adobe Air. The backend of the server relies on relational database server (MySQL) for storing.
Each “game” was considered as a thread, this method allowed us to resolve the main issue for rematching clients
dynamically and keeping alive simultaneously other instances in progress.
18Subjects did not receive a show up fee.
19Self-reported risk attitudes are coded based on a question asking participants to position themselves on a scale
between 0 and 10 from more risk averse to more risk loving. Some participants did not fill in the survey which
explains that regressions controlling for individual characteristics will be run on fewer observations.
20We do not cluster at the individual level since the assumption in these type of environments is that each
game can be considered as an individual observation. Note, however, that the significance of the main results is
maintained if we do cluster at the individual level.
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5.1.1 Testing the central theoretical prediction
We first test the central prediction of the theory summarized in Hypothesis 1. Figure 1, focusing
on the bottom panels, clearly shows that the percentage of players investing 1 drops when moving
from the NP-LV treatment to the NP-HV treatment, thus graphically validating Hypothesis 1.
A potential worry is that this result is not driven by our mechanism but by differences in the
investors’ perceptions of the two gambles. However, when the same comparison is made between
the two LP treatments (Figure 1 top panels), the effect tends to go in the other direction: in
the case of legal protection of the investment, an investment of one is more likely in the HV
treatments. Thus, if any behavioral mechanism not considered by our theoretical framework was
playing a role this would tend to go in the opposite direction with respect to our findings.
Infinitely repeated games in the lab are often characterized by process of learning, either
about the game itself, or about the characteristics of the population (see for instance Dal Bo and
Frechette (2011)). In Figure 2, we examine the evolution across supergames of the percentage of
players investing 1, comparing the NP-HV and NP-LV treatments. While the levels are initially
similar, for later supergames, the percentage of players investing 1 becomes significantly higher
in the NP-LV treatment.21
We test formally Hypothesis 1 controlling for different factors. Table 6 reports the results of
a probit regression of the probability of an investment of one by Player 1. The probability of
observing an investment of one in the NP-LV treatment is significantly higher than in the NP-HV
treatment. This is in particular the case for late matches (considered in column (8)), reflecting
the potential role of learning.
While the theory makes a clear prediction that an investment of 1 should be significantly
less likely in the NP-HV treatments, it does not indicate whether the players should then revert
to playing the degenerate equilibrium, or should start investing more. An added value of the
experiment is that we can also document these behaviors not described by the theory. Figure 1
clearly shows that both types of transfers occur: players are significantly more likely to invest 0 in
the NP-HV treatment compared to NP-LV but also significantly more likely to invest 11. Overall,
we find that this leads to a higher average level of investment under the NP-HV treatment than
under the NP-LV. We discuss this further in section 5.1.3.
5.1.2 Cooperative behavior
The mechanism we highlight in the theory is based on the fact that an investment of 1 is not suffi-
cient in the NP-HV treatment to sustain cooperation. This intuition is summarized in Hypothesis
2.
Before formally testing Hypothesis 2, we first document in Figure 4 the rate at which CC and
21Figure 2 shows that this is mostly due to the proportion of those playing 1 increasing in the NP-LV treatment
rather than the proportion in NP-HV falling. See Figure 8 in Supplementary Appendix C for details on the different
investment choices by treatment over time.
14
DD are played. The Figure shows that DD outcomes are more likely in the NP-HV treatments,
and particularly so in later matches.
It is, of course, not easy to interpret the actions chosen in the stage prisoner dilemma game
following an investment that should not occur in equilibrium. In particular, why would the
investor make a positive investment choice if he then expects DD to be the most likely outcome?
It may therefore be more natural to focus on the behavior of player 2 following an investment of
1 by the investor, as summarized in Hypothesis 2. The results are presented in Figure 5: player
2 is more likely to choose D in the high-volatility treatments than the low volatility treatments.
The results presented in table 7 (behavior of player 2) and 8 (outcome of the game) confirm these
graphical results. The effect of the treatment is particularly strong when controlling for individual
characteristics, such as whether the player cooperated in the first round of the game or whether
he invested in the previous supergame.
Our theory predicts that cooperation is significantly more likely following an investment of 1
in the NP-LV than in the NP-HV since grim trigger is no longer an equilibrium in the NP-HV
treatment. Following all other levels of investment, grim trigger is an equilibrium. However, the
more player 1 invests, the higher the expected continuation value in equilibrium if CC is played
whenever a prize is obtained and thus the higher the incentives to keep cooperating. It is therefore
natural to examine how cooperation varies when the investment levels change. Figure 5 examines
this question, separating decisions by Player 1 and Player 2. There is a very slight trend for
Player 1 in the HV treatment, but not significant.
5.1.3 Average levels of investment
Comparing the level of investment in an environment, such as the one described in our theoretical
analysis, with and without legal protection is hard based on real world data for the simple reason
that counter-factuals are hard to come by. Experiments creating artificial counter-factuals are
thus a valuable source of evidence to shed light on this comparison. We compare in Figure 6
the average levels of investment across the different treatments. The first thing to notice is that
the average level of investment is slightly higher under no protection than under protection, in
particular when comparing only the high volatility treatments. This important fact suggests legal
protection is not a necessary condition for investment.
The second fact that clearly stands out is that the average level of investment is higher under
the NP-HV treatment compared to the NP-LV treatment. In the experiment we thus find that
taking a mean-preserving spread of the distribution leads to more investment on average. The
theory just predicts that an investment of 1 should become less likely, but does not indicate
what the reversal should be. Our experiment shows that players react by both reverting to the
degenerate equilibrium for some of them, but also investing more for others.
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6 Conclusion
Our theory of investment and cooperation in the shadow of future interactions has multiple
possible applications. In particular, our central results can be summarized in the context of a
specific example, that of the firm Red Hat. Red Hat, a hugely successful company, was created in
1993. At its stock market introduction, Red Hat was one of the biggest IPOs in the NASDAQ and,
since 2009, has been part of the S&P500, with over 3000 employees and revenues of over 500 million
dollars. For many, this success is puzzling, since the company’s business model is based on open
source software. Most of Red Hat’s revenues come from the sale to companies of subscriptions,
including their own pre-compiled version of the open source operating system Linux, called Red
Hat Enterprise Linux, and support services.22 Two facts are particularly striking. First, as
acknowledged in Red Hat’s annual report: “anyone can copy, modify and redistribute Red Hat
Enterprise Linux (...) however they are not permitted to refer to these products as Red Hat”.
Numerous clones do indeed exist, but they appear to avoid competing aggressively and do not
gain much market share. Second, in spite of a potentially extremely competitive environment,
Red Hat invests a lot in research. According to a report from the Linux Foundation, Red Hat is
the biggest single contributor to the Linux Kernel (excluding unaffiliated contributors), and pays
the salaries of many of the top contributing individuals.
Our model can explain such behavior. On the equilibrium path, Red Hat’s clones, rationally
choose not to be too aggressive.23 This can be part of an equilibrium only if Red Hat invests
sufficiently in research. In the spirit of our Proposition 2, the type of environment in which Red
Hat operates seems particularly well adapted for investment in the absence of protection since
it involves many small incremental innovations (high probability of obtaining small returns). Of
course this claim is tricky to establish empirically. This is the main justification for conducting
the laboratory experiment that broadly confirms our results.
Greif (1989 and 1993) finds that social norms in medieval times were able to sustain long-
distance trade in the absence of contract enforcement by courts. Our model suggests an informal
arrangement complementary to the one developed by Greif, and suggests, moreover, that trade
might have been even more intense because of the absence of legal rules. Merchants needed to
keep the promise of the future high to keep intermediaries cooperative. Interestingly, the model
suggests that the merchants would not send bigger ships (which would leave the incentives to
deviate unchanged) but more robust ones having higher chances of reaching their final destination.
22According to Red Hat’s annual report, the revenues from subscriptions in 2010 were $541M out of a total
revenue of $652M .
23The manager of a clone declared in an interview, “We have the utmost respect for Red Hat and everything
they have done for the community over the years. We have absolutely no desire to upset them” (Kerner 2005).
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Table 3: Investment options in HV vs LV treatments
LV treatments HV treatments
Investment Prize Probability Prize Probability
0 8 0 16 0
1 8 0.3 16 0.15
6 8 0.4 16 0.2
11 8 0.5 16 0.25
Table 4: Profits and deviation incentives in NP treatments
LV treatments HV treatments
Investment Expected Deviation Expected Deviation
profits of incentive profits of incentives
player 1 player 1
1 10.8 -2.8 14.8 1.2
6 13.1 -5.1 17.1 -1.1
11 15.3 -7.3 19.3 -3.3
NOTE: Expected profits of player 1 refers to the equilibrium expected profits, in a period post investment where
a prize is obtained, under the assumption that (C,C) is played, i.e 1
2
pi + δ
1−δ p(k)
1
2
pi. Deviation incentives is the
difference between the prize (i.e deviation profits) and the expected profits, i.e pi −
(
1
2
pi + δ
1−δ p(k)
1
2
pi
)
A positive
value for the deviation incentives means that level of investment cannot be part of an equilibrium.
21
T
ab
le
5:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
N
P
-L
V
N
P
-H
V
L
P
-L
V
L
P
-H
V
L
P
N
P
N
su
p
er
ga
m
es
p
er
su
b
je
ct
14
.0
5
16
.6
6
(9
.3
0)
(1
1.
90
)
N
ro
u
n
d
s
in
m
at
ch
5.
51
5.
30
(5
.6
6)
(5
.7
0)
ge
n
d
er
0.
32
0.
38
0.
24
0.
49
0.
34
0.
3
5
(0
.4
7)
(0
.4
8)
(0
.4
2)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.4
7)
(0
.4
7
)
st
u
d
en
t
0.
64
0.
46
0.
88
0.
31
0.
66
0.
56
(0
.4
7)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.3
2)
(0
.4
6)
(0
.4
7)
(0
.4
9
)
ri
sk
4.
97
5.
88
4.
59
5.
06
4.
77
5.
39
(2
.2
0)
(1
.9
5)
(1
.9
6)
(1
.6
9)
(1
.8
7)
(2
.1
3
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
49
1
45
6
49
9
31
0
80
9
90
3
m
ea
n
co
effi
ci
en
ts
;
sd
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
∗
p
<
0
.0
5
,
∗∗
p
<
0
.0
1
,
∗∗
∗
p
<
0
.0
0
1
22
T
ab
le
6:
In
ve
st
m
en
t
d
ec
is
io
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
In
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
1
In
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
1
In
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
1
In
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
1
In
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
1
In
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
1
In
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
1
N
P
-H
V
-0
.3
7
*
*
-0
.2
9
*
*
-0
.3
6
*
-0
.4
1
*
-0
.3
7
*
-0
.2
8
-0
.4
3
*
*
(0
.1
5
)
(0
.1
3
)
(0
.2
1
)
(0
.2
1
)
(0
.2
1
)
(0
.1
8
)
(0
.2
0
)
g
e
n
d
e
r
-0
.0
3
4
0
.1
4
5
0
.1
4
2
0
.1
3
1
0
.1
3
5
0
.2
7
4
(0
.2
2
8
)
(0
.2
1
6
)
(0
.2
1
6
)
(0
.2
0
9
)
(0
.2
3
2
)
(0
.2
2
5
)
st
u
d
e
n
t
0
.6
4
5
*
*
*
0
.6
3
1
*
*
*
0
.5
6
9
*
*
0
.6
3
4
*
*
*
0
.6
5
0
*
*
*
0
.6
1
6
*
*
(0
.2
4
7
)
(0
.2
2
2
)
(0
.2
3
8
)
(0
.2
2
3
)
(0
.2
2
2
)
(0
.2
4
2
)
ri
sk
=
3
-0
.1
2
8
-0
.1
8
8
-0
.1
1
7
-0
.2
3
0
0
.0
5
3
(0
.4
2
4
)
(0
.3
7
4
)
(0
.4
2
1
)
(0
.4
0
0
)
(0
.6
2
7
)
ri
sk
=
4
0
.3
2
0
0
.3
2
1
0
.3
2
1
0
.3
4
5
0
.4
2
8
(0
.2
9
4
)
(0
.2
7
9
)
(0
.2
8
7
)
(0
.3
3
1
)
(0
.3
7
6
)
ri
sk
=
5
-0
.0
8
2
-0
.1
4
3
-0
.0
7
7
-0
.2
0
0
0
.0
2
7
(0
.4
4
1
)
(0
.3
9
6
)
(0
.4
3
0
)
(0
.4
4
9
)
(0
.5
9
0
)
ri
sk
=
6
-0
.4
7
4
-0
.5
1
4
-0
.4
5
7
-0
.6
3
5
-0
.2
1
0
(0
.5
5
8
)
(0
.5
2
0
)
(0
.5
4
7
)
(0
.6
4
6
)
(0
.6
9
1
)
ri
sk
=
7
-0
.2
6
1
-0
.3
1
2
-0
.2
5
7
-0
.2
7
4
-0
.1
2
4
(0
.4
3
2
)
(0
.4
4
1
)
(0
.4
3
6
)
(0
.4
5
5
)
(0
.5
8
3
)
ri
sk
=
8
0
.3
5
0
0
.2
9
3
0
.3
6
4
0
.2
7
1
0
.4
8
3
(0
.5
3
1
)
(0
.5
1
2
)
(0
.5
2
9
)
(0
.5
4
4
)
(0
.6
4
5
)
ri
sk
=
9
-1
.3
1
6
-1
.4
4
7
*
-1
.3
1
7
-1
.4
6
7
*
-1
.1
6
2
(0
.8
1
5
)
(0
.8
7
5
)
(0
.8
0
6
)
(0
.7
7
0
)
(0
.9
5
3
)
ri
sk
=
1
0
-0
.9
6
2
*
*
*
-0
.9
3
6
*
*
*
-0
.9
5
2
*
*
*
-0
.9
2
1
*
*
*
(0
.1
6
3
)
(0
.1
6
0
)
(0
.1
5
5
)
(0
.1
9
9
)
S
u
p
e
rg
a
m
e
0
.0
1
4
(0
.0
1
2
)
le
n
g
th
L
a
st
m
a
tc
h
-0
.0
1
5
*
(0
.0
0
8
)
fi
rs
tC
o
o
p
0
.3
8
4
*
*
(0
.1
5
9
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
-0
.1
6
2
*
*
-0
.5
6
3
*
*
*
-0
.5
1
0
*
-0
.6
2
2
*
*
-0
.4
3
5
-0
.5
7
1
*
-0
.6
1
1
(0
.0
7
2
)
(0
.1
3
9
)
(0
.2
8
8
)
(0
.2
9
2
)
(0
.2
7
6
)
(0
.3
1
4
)
(0
.4
8
0
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
9
4
7
8
9
3
8
9
3
8
9
3
8
9
3
8
9
3
7
0
2
In
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
,
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
se
ss
io
n
le
v
el
.
In
th
e
la
st
co
lu
m
n
w
e
re
p
o
rt
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
su
p
er
g
a
m
es
fo
ll
ow
in
g
th
e
fi
ft
h
m
a
tc
h
.
In
v
es
tm
en
t
1
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
th
a
t
is
eq
u
a
l
to
1
w
h
en
P
la
y
er
1
in
v
es
te
d
1
to
k
en
/
ri
sk
re
p
re
se
n
ts
th
e
a
n
sw
er
s
to
th
e
ri
sk
av
er
si
o
n
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
a
ir
e
/
S
u
p
er
g
a
m
e
is
a
va
ri
a
b
le
m
ea
su
ri
n
g
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
su
p
er
g
a
m
es
p
la
y
ed
in
th
e
p
a
st
/
L
en
g
th
L
a
st
is
a
va
ri
a
b
le
ta
k
in
g
th
e
va
lu
e
o
f
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
ro
u
n
d
s
p
la
y
ed
b
y
p
la
y
er
i
a
t
t-
1
/
fi
rs
tC
o
o
p
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
eq
u
a
l
to
o
n
e
if
P
la
y
er
i
C
o
o
p
er
a
te
d
a
t
th
e
fi
rs
t
ro
u
n
d
o
f
th
e
fi
rs
t
m
a
tc
h
.
23
T
ab
le
7:
C
o
op
er
at
io
n
b
y
P
la
ye
r
2
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
P
2
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
P
2
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
P
2
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
P
2
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
P
2
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
P
2
C
o
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
P
2
N
P
-H
V
-0
.4
4
-0
.3
6
-0
.7
1
*
*
-0
.6
9
*
-0
.6
9
*
-0
.6
3
*
*
-0
.8
4
*
*
(0
.3
8
)
(0
.3
1
)
(0
.3
6
)
(0
.3
6
)
(0
.4
0
)
(0
.3
2
)
(0
.4
2
)
g
e
n
d
e
r
0
.0
1
4
-0
.0
4
1
-0
.0
3
4
-0
.0
4
9
0
.5
8
9
-0
.1
2
5
(0
.3
2
1
)
(0
.2
8
1
)
(0
.2
8
7
)
(0
.2
5
6
)
(0
.3
6
2
)
(0
.2
7
3
)
st
u
d
e
n
t
-0
.4
4
5
*
-0
.2
7
4
-0
.2
0
3
-0
.2
5
9
0
.4
0
3
-0
.2
9
0
(0
.2
4
6
)
(0
.2
7
6
)
(0
.2
7
5
)
(0
.2
6
6
)
(0
.2
8
8
)
(0
.2
8
7
)
ri
sk
=
3
0
.2
4
2
0
.2
4
3
0
.3
0
9
-1
.1
6
2
-0
.1
9
2
(0
.6
8
5
)
(0
.6
8
2
)
(0
.6
8
9
)
(0
.7
8
0
)
(0
.6
4
4
)
ri
sk
=
4
-0
.7
9
3
-0
.8
2
9
-0
.7
8
0
-2
.0
1
5
*
-1
.3
2
5
(1
.0
1
7
)
(1
.0
0
0
)
(1
.0
5
8
)
(1
.0
4
8
)
(0
.9
2
9
)
ri
sk
=
5
1
.4
5
6
*
*
1
.4
6
8
*
*
1
.3
7
1
*
-1
.2
0
1
*
*
*
1
.4
2
7
*
*
(0
.6
8
9
)
(0
.6
9
5
)
(0
.7
1
7
)
(0
.2
7
4
)
(0
.6
4
5
)
ri
sk
=
6
0
.5
4
0
0
.5
1
6
0
.5
3
0
-1
.9
8
7
*
*
*
-0
.2
0
8
(0
.7
3
1
)
(0
.6
8
4
)
(0
.7
4
5
)
(0
.5
9
1
)
(0
.6
6
5
)
ri
sk
=
7
-0
.0
2
6
-0
.0
5
3
-0
.0
2
0
-1
.5
5
5
*
*
*
-0
.5
0
6
(0
.6
1
7
)
(0
.6
1
3
)
(0
.6
5
8
)
(0
.4
5
4
)
(0
.5
6
7
)
ri
sk
=
8
-0
.2
0
1
-0
.1
8
7
-0
.1
8
1
-0
.9
1
2
*
*
*
-0
.6
1
4
(0
.7
5
3
)
(0
.7
7
4
)
(0
.7
7
3
)
(0
.2
2
3
)
(0
.7
2
7
)
ri
sk
=
9
-0
.4
1
5
-0
.3
9
1
-0
.3
7
2
-1
.8
9
8
*
*
*
-0
.8
3
2
*
(0
.4
9
5
)
(0
.4
9
4
)
(0
.5
3
3
)
(0
.4
4
9
)
(0
.4
8
6
)
S
u
p
e
rg
a
m
e
-0
.0
0
9
(0
.0
0
6
)
le
n
g
th
L
a
st
m
a
tc
h
-0
.0
4
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
3
)
fi
rs
tC
o
o
p
2
.1
4
4
*
*
*
(0
.2
5
4
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
0
.1
6
9
0
.4
4
6
0
.3
6
6
0
.4
5
9
0
.5
4
8
-0
.2
0
1
0
.8
4
3
*
(0
.2
4
5
)
(0
.4
0
2
)
(0
.5
4
0
)
(0
.5
1
0
)
(0
.5
3
0
)
(0
.2
8
5
)
(0
.4
8
0
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
8
3
1
7
1
1
6
7
1
6
7
1
6
7
1
1
6
1
5
2
In
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
,
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
se
ss
io
n
le
v
el
/
ri
sk
re
p
re
se
n
ts
th
e
a
n
sw
er
s
to
th
e
ri
sk
av
er
si
o
n
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
a
ir
e
S
u
p
er
g
a
m
e
is
a
va
ri
a
b
le
m
ea
su
ri
n
g
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
su
p
er
g
a
m
es
p
la
y
ed
in
th
e
p
a
st
L
en
g
th
L
a
st
is
a
va
ri
a
b
le
ta
k
in
g
th
e
va
lu
e
o
f
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
ro
u
n
d
s
p
la
y
ed
b
y
p
la
y
er
i
a
t
t-
1
fi
rs
tC
o
o
p
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
eq
u
a
l
to
o
n
e
if
P
la
y
er
i
C
o
o
p
er
a
te
d
a
t
th
e
fi
rs
t
ro
u
n
d
o
f
th
e
fi
rs
t
m
a
tc
h
*
p
≤
0
.1
,
*
*
p
≤
0
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
≤
0
.0
1
24
T
ab
le
8:
C
o
op
er
at
io
n
ou
tc
om
es
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
C
C
c
h
o
ic
e
s
C
C
c
h
o
ic
e
s
C
C
c
h
o
ic
e
s
C
C
c
h
o
ic
e
s
C
C
c
h
o
ic
e
s
C
C
c
h
o
ic
e
s
C
C
c
h
o
ic
e
s
C
C
c
h
o
ic
e
s
N
P
-H
V
-0
.6
8
-0
.4
9
-1
.5
4
*
*
*
-1
.5
7
*
*
*
-1
.5
5
*
*
*
-1
.5
9
*
*
*
-1
.2
8
*
*
*
-1
.5
9
*
*
*
(0
.5
3
)
(0
.4
5
)
(0
.4
7
)
(0
.4
8
)
(0
.4
8
)
(0
.4
7
)
(0
.4
8
)
(0
.3
9
)
g
e
n
d
e
rP
1
0
.0
4
5
-0
.8
7
6
*
-0
.8
0
4
*
-0
.8
1
9
*
-0
.8
8
1
*
-0
.9
4
8
*
*
*
-0
.9
5
2
*
*
(0
.2
6
5
)
(0
.4
6
8
)
(0
.4
2
1
)
(0
.4
6
0
)
(0
.4
7
5
)
(0
.3
0
2
)
(0
.4
7
2
)
st
u
d
e
n
tP
1
-0
.0
1
5
0
.0
9
4
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
9
6
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
4
7
0
.0
7
6
(0
.2
2
7
)
(0
.3
5
5
)
(0
.3
2
5
)
(0
.3
3
4
)
(0
.3
7
1
)
(0
.3
1
4
)
(0
.3
1
0
)
g
e
n
d
e
rP
2
0
.0
6
8
-0
.2
2
2
-0
.2
5
9
-0
.2
2
9
-0
.2
3
1
-0
.2
3
1
-0
.2
3
5
(0
.3
6
1
)
(0
.2
2
9
)
(0
.2
4
2
)
(0
.2
4
0
)
(0
.2
2
6
)
(0
.2
7
4
)
(0
.2
9
1
)
st
u
d
e
n
tP
2
-0
.1
4
4
0
.3
4
5
0
.3
8
4
0
.4
5
4
*
*
0
.3
1
4
*
0
.5
5
8
*
*
0
.4
0
1
(0
.2
3
6
)
(0
.2
1
3
)
(0
.2
3
5
)
(0
.2
0
1
)
(0
.1
7
5
)
(0
.2
7
6
)
(0
.2
4
8
)
ri
sk
P
1
=
3
1
.1
3
5
*
1
.3
0
2
*
*
1
.1
9
7
*
*
1
.1
5
4
*
0
.8
8
6
*
1
.2
0
6
*
(0
.5
8
0
)
(0
.5
9
1
)
(0
.5
5
2
)
(0
.6
0
5
)
(0
.5
3
8
)
(0
.6
2
8
)
ri
sk
P
1
=
4
-1
.1
1
6
-1
.0
2
0
-1
.0
8
4
-1
.0
1
7
-0
.8
7
4
-1
.1
7
1
(0
.7
7
0
)
(0
.7
7
8
)
(0
.7
1
9
)
(0
.8
1
2
)
(0
.6
5
8
)
(0
.7
5
6
)
ri
sk
P
1
=
5
2
.4
2
3
*
*
2
.6
4
2
*
*
*
2
.5
1
3
*
*
2
.6
8
5
*
*
2
.2
6
8
*
*
2
.4
8
0
*
*
(1
.0
4
5
)
(1
.0
0
0
)
(0
.9
9
6
)
(1
.0
4
3
)
(0
.9
5
3
)
(0
.9
7
5
)
ri
sk
P
1
=
6
1
.5
3
1
1
.6
7
0
*
1
.5
8
1
1
.6
2
2
0
.9
6
5
1
.5
4
8
(1
.0
3
3
)
(0
.9
8
3
)
(0
.9
7
2
)
(1
.0
8
2
)
(0
.7
5
2
)
(1
.0
2
0
)
ri
sk
P
1
=
7
-0
.2
6
1
-0
.0
4
2
-0
.1
0
9
-0
.2
8
8
0
.1
0
3
-0
.3
1
9
(0
.5
6
1
)
(0
.6
9
5
)
(0
.6
7
2
)
(0
.5
1
0
)
(0
.4
8
8
)
(0
.7
2
1
)
ri
sk
P
1
=
8
0
.6
3
1
0
.7
5
9
0
.6
6
6
0
.7
4
6
0
.6
9
4
0
.7
1
5
(0
.7
5
6
)
(0
.7
8
0
)
(0
.7
4
7
)
(0
.7
6
8
)
(0
.7
0
3
)
(0
.7
1
6
)
ri
sk
P
2
=
3
-0
.1
1
8
-0
.1
8
5
-0
.1
4
5
-0
.1
4
9
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.2
4
1
(0
.4
7
0
)
(0
.3
6
1
)
(0
.3
9
4
)
(0
.4
9
3
)
(0
.5
4
0
)
(0
.5
6
3
)
ri
sk
P
2
=
4
-0
.9
8
4
-1
.0
6
6
-1
.0
6
1
-1
.0
4
9
-0
.6
9
1
-0
.9
2
3
(1
.0
0
2
)
(0
.9
5
5
)
(0
.9
7
4
)
(1
.0
8
9
)
(1
.0
0
5
)
(0
.9
9
5
)
ri
sk
P
2
=
5
1
.2
5
0
*
1
.0
6
1
*
1
.1
5
5
*
1
.1
0
2
1
.3
1
2
*
*
1
.3
4
2
*
(0
.6
7
2
)
(0
.5
8
4
)
(0
.6
0
4
)
(0
.6
8
3
)
(0
.5
6
9
)
(0
.7
6
5
)
ri
sk
P
2
=
6
0
.4
9
7
0
.4
4
8
0
.4
7
3
0
.6
3
5
0
.6
5
2
0
.7
9
0
(0
.4
9
0
)
(0
.3
7
9
)
(0
.3
8
9
)
(0
.5
4
6
)
(0
.4
4
4
)
(0
.5
2
7
)
ri
sk
P
2
=
7
-0
.6
0
3
-0
.7
4
2
-0
.6
8
2
-0
.7
4
9
-0
.4
8
8
-0
.6
5
2
(0
.5
0
2
)
(0
.4
5
6
)
(0
.4
8
9
)
(0
.5
3
5
)
(0
.5
1
2
)
(0
.5
3
1
)
ri
sk
P
2
=
8
-0
.1
4
1
-0
.2
9
0
-0
.2
0
7
-0
.2
8
6
0
.0
1
7
-0
.1
3
7
(0
.4
9
8
)
(0
.3
9
4
)
(0
.4
6
9
)
(0
.5
4
4
)
(0
.5
1
2
)
(0
.5
1
2
)
ri
sk
P
2
=
9
-0
.5
2
9
-0
.7
5
0
*
*
-0
.6
4
7
*
-0
.4
4
2
-0
.2
8
9
-0
.7
2
8
(0
.3
4
2
)
(0
.3
5
9
)
(0
.3
7
2
)
(0
.3
0
0
)
(0
.3
5
4
)
(0
.7
5
4
)
ri
sk
P
2
=
1
0
-0
.0
4
7
-0
.1
4
8
-0
.1
0
4
-0
.0
9
9
-0
.0
8
8
-0
.1
1
0
(0
.6
0
7
)
(0
.5
2
1
)
(0
.5
4
0
)
(0
.6
0
2
)
(0
.5
4
2
)
(0
.6
3
7
)
S
u
p
e
rg
a
m
e
-0
.0
2
6
*
-0
.0
1
3
(0
.0
1
5
)
(0
.0
1
4
)
S
u
p
e
rg
a
m
e
0
.0
1
7
(0
.0
1
2
)
le
n
g
th
L
a
st
m
a
tc
h
-0
.0
8
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
8
)
fi
rs
tC
o
o
p
0
.9
0
1
*
*
*
(0
.2
6
3
)
H
a
d
In
v
e
st
e
d
-0
.1
4
4
(0
.4
3
2
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
-0
.3
1
1
-0
.2
4
7
-0
.7
0
3
-0
.5
7
8
-0
.5
8
2
-0
.2
2
5
-1
.1
5
4
-0
.5
6
9
(0
.2
8
0
)
(0
.6
2
3
)
(0
.9
8
3
)
(0
.9
4
1
)
(0
.9
6
6
)
(1
.1
6
2
)
(1
.0
5
6
)
(1
.2
9
1
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
8
3
1
6
5
1
6
3
1
6
3
1
6
3
1
6
3
1
6
3
1
5
4
In
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
,
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
se
ss
io
n
le
v
el
L
en
g
th
L
a
st
is
a
va
ri
a
b
le
ta
k
in
g
th
e
va
lu
e
o
f
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
ro
u
n
d
s
p
la
y
ed
b
y
p
la
y
er
i
a
t
t-
1
S
u
p
er
g
a
m
e
is
a
va
ri
a
b
le
m
ea
su
ri
n
g
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
su
p
er
g
a
m
es
p
la
y
ed
in
th
e
p
a
st
C
C
ch
o
ic
es
is
a
va
ri
a
b
le
eq
u
a
l
to
o
n
e
w
h
en
b
o
th
P
la
y
er
s
ch
o
se
to
co
o
p
er
a
te
fi
rs
tC
o
o
p
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
eq
u
a
l
to
o
n
e
if
P
la
y
er
i
C
o
o
p
er
a
te
d
a
t
th
e
fi
rs
t
ro
u
n
d
o
f
th
e
fi
rs
t
m
a
tc
h
*
p
≤
0
.1
,
*
*
p
≤
0
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
≤
0
.0
1
25
Figure 1
Figure 2
26
Figure 3
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
%
 o
f P
lay
er
s
DD DC CD CC
action distribution
NP-LV
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
%
 o
f P
lay
er
s
DD DC CD CC
action distribution
NP-HV
Note: C stands for Cooperate, D stands for Defect; the first letter represents Player 1's choice
Cooperation by treatment for investment 1
Figure 4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
10
0
0 5 10 15 20
Supergame
CC DD
NP-LV
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
10
0
0 5 10 15 20
Supergame
CC DD
NP-HV
% of games with CC and DD choices by supergame
27
Figure 5
Figure 6
28
8 Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose there exists a value p˜i and an investment k such that
conditions (1) and (2) hold and let Player 1 choose pi = p˜i in Period 0 along with an investment
k. Consider an equilibrium path in which both players play C forever with a threat of D forever
(the worst punishment) if anyone deviates (including Player 1 initially deviating to a different
choice of k). Suppose that in period t the realization of the payoff variable is pit and recall that
pˆit = min {pit, p¯i}. Starting in period t, following the path yields a player (for i = 1 or o)
αpˆit + α
δ
1− δ
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
while deviating yields
βpˆit + λ
δ
1− δ
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
Both players follow the path if
(β − α) pˆit ≤ (α− λ) δ
1− δ
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
for i = 1 and o
iff pˆit ≤ δ
1− δR
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
which holds from condition (1), since pˆit ≤ p¯i = p˜i. Player 1’s overall payoff will then be:
−k + δ
1− δα1
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
From condition (2), this expected payoff is larger than the payoff from choosing a different value
of k since the other player play D forever in that case. Therefore conditions (1) and (2) guarantee
that a subgame perfect equilibrium with investment k > kd exists.
Conversely, for given k, let p˜imax = {sup p˜i s.t. 1 holds} (we showed in the main text that
p˜imax exists). Then p˜imax is an upperbound on the single period payoff on which the players can
cooperate. If:
−k + δ
1− δα1
(∫ pimax
0
pidF (pi, k) + pimax (1− F (pimax))
)
< −kd + δ
1− δλ1
∫ ∞
0
pidF (pi, kd)
then Player 1 will prefer to invest kd to k.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that under G there is a symmetric subgame perfect
29
equilibrium in which Player 1 invests k. From Proposition 1 there is a p˜i such that
p˜i ≤ δ
1− δR
(∫ p˜i
0
pidG (pi, k) + p˜i (1−G (p˜i))
)
and
−k + δ
1− δα
(∫ pi
0
pidG (pi, k) + pi (1−G (pi))
)
≥ −kd + δ
1− δλ
∫ ∞
0
pidG (pi, kd)
Integrating by parts, we can rewrite these conditions as:
pi ≤ R δ
1− δ
(
pi −
∫ pi
0
G(pi, k)dpi
)
and
−k + δ
1− δα
(
pi −
∫ pi
0
G(pi, k)dpi
)
≥ −kd + δ
1− δλ
∫ ∞
0
pidG (pi, kd)
Since G is a mean-preserving spread of F , F second order stochastically dominates G. From
the definition of second order stochastic dominance,(
pi −
∫ pi
0
G(pi, k)dpi
)
≤
(
pi −
∫ pi
0
F (pi, k)dpi
)
.
Hence,
pi ≤ R δ
1− δ
(
pi −
∫ pi
0
F (pi, k)dpi
)
and
−k + δ
1− δα
(
pi −
∫ pi
0
F (pi, k)dpi
)
≥ −kd + δ
1− δλ
∫ ∞
0
pidG (pi, kd)
= −kd + δ
1− δλ
∫ ∞
0
pidF (pi, kd)
Thus, a choice of k is also sustainable under F . Conversely, we give an example in the main text
showing that some investments k 6= kd can be part of an equilibrium under F and not under G.
Proof of Proposition 3. We can rewrite the conditions of Proposition 1 for an investment
k as:
pi0
m
≤ δ
1− δRmh(k)
pi0
m
⇔ 1
m
≤ δ
1− δRh(k) (3)
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and
− k + δ
1− δαpi0h(k) ≥ −kd +
δ
1− δλpi0h(kd) (4)
Let m be defined by:
1
m
=
δ
1− δRh(k
∗)
For m > m, the cooperation constraint (3) is satisfied. Given that k∗ is part of an equilibrium
for m=1, the investment constraint (4) is also satisfied. So, as stated in the Proposition 1, k∗ is
a subgame perfect equilibrium and so are some values k larger and smaller than k∗.
For m < m, the cooperation constraint (3) evaluated at k∗ is violated, so that following an
investment of k ≤ k∗ the players play non-cooperatively and the only possible equilibrium with
k ≤ k∗ is the degenerate equilibrium, where Player 1 chooses k = kd.
There is however a range of values such that some investments strictly above k∗ are part of
an equilibrium. Define m as:
1
m
=
δ
1− δRh(k)
where k is such that:
−k + δ
1− δαpi0h(k) = −kd +
δ
1− δλpi0h(kd)
Given this definition, for m ≥ m, an investment of k > k∗ is part of a subgame perfect
equilibrium. This establishes the second result of the Proposition.
Finally, for m < m, the only non-degenerate equilibria would involve investments above k.
We show below that this would lead to negative profits and cannot therefore be an equilibrium.
Thus, for this region, the only subgame perfect equilibrium is the degenerate equilibrium.
Define:
G(k) = −k + δ
1− δαpi0h(k)−
(
−kd + δ
1− δλpi0h(kd)
)
We know G(k∗) > 0, G(k) = 0, and because G′′ < 0, this implies that G′ < 0 for k > k. Thus
G(k) < 0 for k > k
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9 Appendix C: Supplementary Material
9.1 Details on applications
Investment in countries with weak property rights
In the case of investments in countries with weak property rights, we can think of expropriation
as imposing a very high tax rate. The firm decides whether to evade taxes and the government
simultaneously decides on the tax rate. In the case of a reliable legal system, the tax authority
cannot arbitrarily impose an exorbitant high tax rate and the firm cannot evade. In the absence of
a reliable legal system, the two players play a prisoner’s dilemma. For the firm, C corresponds to
not evading and paying the full amount of taxes while D corresponds to evading a fixed portion
1 − e of the production at a cost c(1 − e)pi (cost of dissimulating some income). For the tax
authority C corresponds to picking a low tax rate τ and D a high one τ (i.e., expropriate the
firm). The game is then the following:24
C D
C ((1− τ)pi , τpi) ((1− τ)pi , τpi)
D ((1− τ)epi + (1− c)(1− e)pi , τepi) ((1− τ)epi + (1− c)(1− e)pi , τepi)
Investment in innovation
With this interpretation, an innovator with a patent simply captures monopoly profits. With-
out a patent, suppose that marginal cost is constant and, say, the firms split the market symmet-
rically when they cooperate. We then have αi =
1
N+1 ,
1
N+1 < βi < 1, γi = 0,and 0 ≤ λi < 1N+1 .25
By setting λi = 0, we can think of (D,D) as a reduced form way of modeling a price war down
to marginal cost.
9.2 Additional theoretical results
A different way of comparing investment levels across regimes is to use the cooperation ratio R.
When R ≈ 0, cooperation is impossible because the gains to cooperation are small relative to the
one-period gain from deviating. Conversely, when R ≈ ∞, cooperation is simple. More generally,
as R decreases cooperation becomes more difficult.26 The following Proposition shows that, again,
this may force Player 1 to invest more than k∗.
24To satisfy the constraints imposed on the coefficients, we need the following conditions (1− τ)pi < (1− τ)epi +
(1− c)(1− e)pi, τpi < τpi, (1− τ)pi > (1− τ)epi + (1− c)(1− e)pi and τpi > τepi. Sufficient conditions are τ > c and
τe− τ + c(1− e) > 0.
25Thus, if N = 4, when two firms play D each one earns ζ
5
, which is the same payoff they would earn if all the
firms played D. As indicated in footnote 4, this is for notational ease. We could instead have that when m firms
play D each one earns ζ
m
without affecting our results.
26Note that varying R amounts to varying the shares α, β, γ, λ.
32
Proposition 4 Fix m and suppose there is a strict symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in
which Player 1 makes the incremental investment k∗ 6= kd. There exists values R and R such that
in the no-protection regime:
• If R ∈ [R,+∞], there may exist subgame perfect equilibria where Player 1 invests more than,
less than, or the same as k∗.
• If R ∈ [R,R], any non-degenerate equilibrium involves higher investments than with protec-
tion: k > k∗.
• If R ∈ [0, R] the only equilibrium is the degenerate equilibrium.
Moreover there are non-empty intervals on which such equilibria exist.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition
3. Given the distribution function at hand, the condition for cooperation can be rewritten as
p˜i ≤ δ1−δRp(k∗)p˜i. Let R be defined by 1 = δ1−δRp(k∗). Since k∗ forms part of a strict equilibrium,
α¯−λ¯
β¯−α¯ > R¯ and −k∗+ δ1−δ α¯p(k∗)p˜i > −kd+ δ1−δ λ¯p(kd)p˜i. By continuity, there are parameters α, β, γ,
and λ for which R > R and Player 1 invests more than k∗ and parameters for which he invests
less. In these equilibria, the other player threatens to play non-cooperatively if Player 1 does not
make the “appropriate” investment.
If R < R, investing k∗ can no longer be part of an equilibrium since the players will play non-
cooperatively following an investment k∗. To induce the players to play cooperatively,a higher
level of investment needs to be made. Again, by continuity there are parameter values for which
R < R and a higher investment forms part of an equilibrium.
Finally, let G(k) = −k + δ1−δp(k)p˜i. Notice that, G (0) = 0 and G (k∗) > 0. Since G′′ < 0 and
G
(
δ
1−δ p˜i
)
< 0, there exists a kˆ > k∗ such that G(kˆ) = 0 and G (k) < 0 for all k > kˆ. Define R
by 1 = δ1−δRp(kˆ). For R < R, cooperation is possible only if k > kˆ. But Player 1 cannot recoup
such an investment since, for all k > kˆ and α, −k+α δ1−δp(k)p˜i < G (k) < 0. Thus, in this region,
the only subgame perfect equilibrium involves an investment k = kd.
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Table 9: Cooperation by Player 2
(1) (2) (3)
Coop. P2 Coop. P2 Coop. P2
HadInvested 0.34
(0.23)
investment 0.012
(0.012)
investment=6 0.366 0.106
(0.332) (0.239)
investment=11 -0.476 -0.458
(0.519) (0.588)
HadInvested=1 × investment=1 0.390** 0.453
(0.166) (0.482)
HadInvested=1 × investment=6 0.072 0.253
(0.411) (0.446)
HadInvested=1 × investment=11 1.007** 0.897
(0.403) (0.803)
Supergame -0.013*
(0.007)
lengthLastmatch -0.022***
(0.008)
Controls No No Yes
Observations 452 452 412
In parentheses, errors clustered at session level / controls include player’s gender and student status / HadInvested
is a variable taking the value of 1 if player B invested > 0 the last time he played as the investor
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